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Credit Markets, Exemptions, and
Households with Nothing to Exempt
Richard M. Hynes*
American bankruptcy law has offered a ''fresh start" in every state for
over one hundred years. As a result, econometric studies of consumer
bankruptcy often focus on one of the few aspects of the law that
has varied significantly across time and across states: exemptions.
Professors Gropp, Scholz and White published the first article to test
the effect of exemptions on credit markets. Consistent with theory, they
found that residents of states with larger exemptions pay higher interest
rates than those in states with lower exemptions and face an increased
probability that they will be denied credit. These effects were most
pronounced for poor households. This result is surprising because
exemptions only allow a household to keep what it has. The difference
between a $100,000 exemption and an exemption with no dollar limit
should not matter if the household has little or no assets to exempt. This
essay examines alternative explanations for why exemptions appear to
have a disproportionate impact on the poor. Unfortunately, however,
none of these alternative explanations proves entirely satisfactory.

INTRODUCTION

After decades of debate, 1 Congress recently enacted reforms that significantly

*

Associate Professor, William & Mary School of Law. Copyright 2005 by Richard M.
Hynes. All rights reserved. Do not quote without permission. Please send comments
to rmhyne@wm.edu. Gilbert Baker and Doug Smith provided excellent research
assistance. The author thanks Todd J. Zywicki and participants at the Cegla Center
Conference on Personal Bankruptcy in the 21st Century for valuable comments. All
errors remain my own.
Calls for means-testing date at least to the 1960s. See, e.g., James Angell
MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy for Wage Earners, 68 Com. L.J. 87, 90 (1963)
(bankruptcy law "demands renewed consideration in the light of mushrooming
wage-earner bankruptcies and the dawning recognition that it is a worthy objective
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limit the ability of some consumers to obtain debt relief in bankruptcy. 2 A
prominent argument in this debate is that generous bankruptcy relief leads
to higher interest rates and reduced access to credit. This claim is intuitively
appealing. If bankruptcy leads to more losses, creditors should be less willing
to lend. Because bankruptcy is federal law and has offered roughly the same
protection for over one hundred years, 3 economists cannot easily measure
bankruptcy's effect on credit markets or even prove the existence of this effect
to those who doubt the validity of economic reasoning.
Economists can, however, measure the impact of one component of
bankruptcy law: property exemptions. Since 1898, American bankruptcy
law has allowed each state to effectively determine the exemptions that
are available to its residents in bankruptcy, 4 and exemption regimes vary
greatly from state to state. For example, a married couple can exempt $75,000
of home equity in Califomia, 5 $20,000 in Georgia, 6 and in Florida they can
exempt all of their home equity regardless of the amount. 7
Though this variation appears extreme, it should not matter to a great
many households. Like most forms of debt relief, exemptions only allow
households to keep what they have, and many Americans borrow because
they don't have assets. The difference between an exemption that allows a
household to keep an unlimited amount of home equity and one that allows
the household to keep "just" $75,000, or even $20,000, should have little
or no effect on households without home equity or other substantial assets

2
3

4

5

6

7

of the law to sustain the character of citizens rather than complacently collaborate
in their demoralization").
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
To be sure, bankruptcy has undergone important changes over the last century. See,
e.g., David Skeel, Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America
(2002). However, since 1898 the most used bankruptcy chapter (first Chapter VII
then Chapter 7): (I) offered consumers a discharge of nearly all debts without (until
2005) explicitly considering the consumer's income or expenses, and (2) allowed
each state to effectively determine what assets the debtor must forfeit in bankruptcy
by allowing the state to determine the exemptions available to the debtor.
In 1902 the Supreme Court ruled that this variation in exemptions did not violate
the Constitution's requirement of "uniform" bankruptcy laws. Hanover Nat'! Bank
v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 703.110(a), 704.730 (Deering 2006). California provides
a homestead exemption of $150,000 for certain groups such as the elderly and the
disabled. /d.
See Ga. Code Ann.§ 44-13-100(a)(l) (2006) (providing a homestead exemption of
$5,000).
Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a)(l).
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to exempt. Thus, very generous exemptions should have an uneven effect
on households. Even if they affect the repayment behavior of households
with substantial assets, they should have little or no effect on the poor. As
a result, the exemptions should not affect the credit available to the poor
unless the value of household assets changes markedly between the time of
borrowing and the time of repayment.
Unfortunately, however, this is not what the empirical literature has found.
Most studies make no attempt to differentiate the effect that exemptions
have on the poor from the effect that they have on the wealthy, and those that
do find results that are sharply inconsistent with expectations. In the earliest
article to examine the impact of exemptions on credit markets, Professors
Gropp, Scholz and White found that consumers who live in states with more
generous exemptions pay higher interest rates and are more likely to be
denied credit or discouraged from borrowing. 8 As the authors emphasize, 9
however, exemptions (even unlimited exemptions) seem to have the most
striking effects on households with so little in assets that they could protect all
of their wealth in nearly every state of their sample. 10 The general puzzle is
not unique to this one study. Another study finds that homestead exemptions
have a very pronounced effect on entrepreneurs who do not own a home. 11

8
9

10

II

Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz & Michelle White, Personal Bankruptcy and Credit
Supply and Demand, 112 Q.J. Econ. 217 (1997).
!d. at 234 ("Thus, it appears that the bankruptcy exemption is strongly correlated
with the probability of being turned down for credit or discouraged for borrowing,
particularly for low asset households.").
/d. at 230 n.3 (defining the lowest quartile of households as those with total assets
of less than $7,885). According to the variables employed by Gropp, Scholz and
White, no more than three states in their sample had exemptions lower than this
amount. !d. at 228-29. There are no observations from Delaware in the data-set
used by Gropp, Scholz and White. In addition, one can reasonably question whether
even these three states had exemptions of less than $8,000. For example, Gropp,
Scholz and White list Iowa as offering a homestead exemption of just $500, but
this limit applied only if the lot on which the house sits is larger than 1/z acre in
a city or 40 acres elsewhere. Iowa Code Ann.§§ 499A.l8, 561.2, 561.16 (1983).
The states that they list as having unlimited exemptions contain similar acreage
restrictions. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. X,§ 4(a)(l) (restricting a homestead to 1!z acre
in a municipality and 160 acres outside the municipality). Rather than revisit each
exemption value they employ, this article tests the robustness of their results by
employing an alternative measure of exemptions.
See Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of
Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 J.L. & Econ. 543, 560-62 (2003). Perhaps there are
better explanations for this result than for the more general puzzle. For example,
some states allow non-homeowners to use some or all of the homestead exemption on
other property, and perhaps their results were picking up this effect. However, some
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One should hesitate before dismissing empirical results that conflict
with theory; perhaps large exemptions affect the poor for some reason.
It is quite difficult to identify a plausible reason why large exemptions
affect those without assets, however, suggesting that the regressions may
not measure the effects of exemptions alone. The regressions may also
measure the importance of some omitted variables that are correlated with
exemptions. Significantly, Professor Villegas uses the same 1983 dataset
used by Gropp, Scholz and White to test whether various non-bankruptcy
collection limitations affect credit markets, and found that they do. 12 At a
minimum, these variables should be included in the regressions. 13
The complexity of debtor-creditor law makes it unlikely that any set of
variables could fully capture the differences in state law. Debt collection
is a low-margin industry, and thus, even laws that make it slightly more
expensive to serve process or to litigate a claim may reduce collections. 14
More troubling is the fact that some variation in the law is not recorded in
statutes and thus is not readily observable. Bankruptcy scholars argue that
"local legal cultures" cause great disparities in bankruptcy practice despite a
national bankruptcy law, 15 and similar cultures may affect the practice of debt
collection in the various states. Unfortunately, the existing scholarship offers

12
13

14

15

of the most generous homestead exemptions (in particular the notorious "unlimited"
homestead exemptions) cannot be applied to other property. I co-authored a prior
study that suggests that exemptions may have a disproportionate impact on lowerincome Americans, a result that is particularly striking because the regressions
included fixed state effects. See Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy
Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage Loans, 42 J.L. & Econ. 809, 825 (1999).
Note, however, that the regression did not explicitly test whether the effects of
exemptions vary by the debtor's level of income, and thus the result may be an
artifact of the model employed. In addition, all of the households in this sample
would own a home if the mortgage loan were granted, and thus it is more plausible
that they would accumulate home equity.
See Daniel J. Villegas, Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation of the FTC's
Credit Practice Rule, 42 J. Econ. & Bus. 51 (1990).
Measured individually, these other variables are not strongly correlated with
exemptions. However, it is possible that they interact in a way that is strongly
correlated with the exemptions, and Gropp, Scholz and White employ probit
regressions and other techniques in which uncorrelated omitted variables can still
bias results.
As noted below, the creditor can sometimes add these costs to the amount that the
debtor owes. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. This right will be rather
hollow, however, if the debtor will not even repay the original amount in full.
See, e.g., Theresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts,
17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 801 (1994).
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no unambiguous variable that summarizes this local legal culture in a way that
could be included in a regression. 16 This essay suggests two proxies for these
other differences that assume that the generosity of debt relief is correlated
with ideology.
This essay finds that prior empirical results of the effect of exemptions
on credit markets do not change significantly when one includes a host
of variables designed to capture other aspects of debtor-creditor law.
Unfortunately, this also means that the added variables fail to explain why
exemptions appear to have a disproportionate effect on those whom they
should affect the least. Clearly, more research must be done to resolve this
puzzle, but until such time policymakers should use the results of empirical
studies of exemptions with some caution. The recent bankruptcy reforms
place a $125,000 ceiling on a homestead exemption if the debtor purchased
the home within the last few years, 17 and there are calls to place an extremely
large ($300,000) cap on homestead exemptions for all bankrupt debtors. 18
While there may be legitimate grounds for capping exemptions, scholars
should be reluctant to conclude that these very high caps will significantly
increase the credit available to the poor because the poor do not have home
equity to exempt. Creditors themselves seem to believe that very large or
"unlimited" exemptions are likely to have little effect on the behavior of most
Americans. In the long debate over bankruptcy reform, creditors expressed
almost no interest in reforming exemptions and actually opposed caps on
homestead exemptions in an effort to limit opposition to the legislation. 19
Part I provides a brief overview of debtor-creditor law. Part II reviews the

The proof offered of this local legal culture is the inability to explain differences
in filing rates and other bankruptcy choices with observable variables such as
exemptions and the unemployment rate. !d. This residual is claimed by other
scholars as evidence of differences in the stigma of filing for bankruptcy. See, e.g.,
David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy and
Delinquency, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 319 (2002).
I 7 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
I 09-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
18 For example, on March 9, 2005, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed an
amendment to the bankruptcy reform legislation that would limit homestead
exemptions to $300,000. Senator Kennedy on Closing the Millionaires' Homestead
Loophole, http:/lkennedy.senate.govrkennedy/statements/05/03/200531 0716.html
(Mar. 9, 2005). This amendment was narrowly defeated. Nicolas Brulliard, Senate
Passes Major Overhaul of Bankruptcy Code, Cox News Service, March 10, 2005.
19 See, e.g., Dan Morgan, GAO: "Homestead Exemption" Aids Well-Off Few; Bush,
Texas Officials on Record as Opposing Move to Limit Bankruptcy Shelter, Wash.
Post, July 18, 1999, at A6 ("Texans also found allies in credit card company lobbyists
who worked against a tough limitation [for homestead exemptions] on grounds that
16

498

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 7:493

prior literature on the effect of debt collection limitations on credit markets.
Part III discusses possible reasons why large exemptions appear to affect
the credit available to those with little or no assets. Part IV presents the
empirical tests. Part V concludes.

I.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF DEBT COLLECTION

Most Americans who do not repay their debts do not file for bankruptcy, 20
and bankruptcy is but one component in a larger system of debt relief. 21 Of
most salience to economists are those non-bankruptcy laws that affect
the ability of a creditor to seize assets of the debtor in satisfaction of its
claim. If the creditor did not bargain in advance for a security interest,
the creditor must sue the debtor in state court before it can attach the
debtor's property. 22 The creditor will often be able to add the cost of filing
suit and serving process to the amount owed by the debtor, 23 though this
right will mean little if the creditor cannot even collect on the original debt.
As a result, many creditors may abandon collection efforts without seeking
a judgment.
Even if the creditor does obtain a judgment, it must find assets to attach.

such a provision would tum Texas and Florida legislators against the bankruptcy
bill and doom chances for reform.").
20 See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass'n, 1997 Installment Credit Survey Report 109 (9th ed.
1997) (reporting that approximately seventy percent of all bank consumer credit
losses occur outside of bankruptcy); Visa U.S.A., Inc., 1999 Annual Bankruptcy
Survey (2000) (reporting that two-thirds of credit card loans charged off as
uncollectible are not attributable to bankruptcy). Some of these loans may, however,
be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding after they are charged off as uncollectible.
These percentages are based on outstanding loans and not on individuals. It is likely
that the percentage of debtors who use bankruptcy is even lower because those
who are most likely to be judgment-proof outside of bankruptcy, i.e. those with low
incomes, are less likely to have large loans.
21 See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 121 (2004).
22 Many states once routinely allowed the pre-judgment attachment of the debtor's
property, but this practice was sharply curtailed by a series of cases that held such
attachments to be a violation of due process unless the debtor is given notice and an
opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
342 (1969).
23 In Illinois the judgment debtor is required to pay the costs of obtaining a garnishment
order "unless ... costs incurred by the judgment creditor were improperly incurred,
in which case those costs shall be paid by the judgment creditor." See 735 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5112-716(a) (2005).
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Federal and state laws, such as the famous "unlimited" homestead exemption
in Florida, 24 will exempt some of the debtor's assets from attachment, and
other assets are likely to be pledged as collateral or hidden from the creditor.
Transaction costs may make those assets that are available difficult to convert
into cash. Any cash owned by the debtor is likely to be in the hands of a third
party in the form of bank deposits or unpaid wages. The creditor may be able
to reach these assets through garnishment, but here, too, the law affords the
debtor some protection. Federal law limits wage garnishment to twenty-five
percent of the debtor's take-home pay or the amount by which the debtor's
take-home pay exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage, which ever
is lower, 25 with some states providing further protection or prohibiting wage
garnishment entire Iy. 26
Sometimes a creditor bargains in advance for the right to seize specific
assets if the debtor defaults. For example, the home equity lender bargains
for the right to seize the home, and the auto title lender bargains for the
right to seize the car. State laws limit the ability of a creditor to foreclose
on some types of collateral, however, either by requiring a lengthy process
or by allowing the debtor to redeem the collateral many months after the
foreclosure is completed. 27 Other states prohibit the creditor from seeking a
judgment against the debtor if the collateral does not yield sufficient funds to
repay the claim in full, at least if the debtor makes use of the most expeditious
methods of foreclosure. 28
The data used by Gropp, Scholz and White and by Villegas (and the
data used in this essay) was collected in 1983, and so one must pay special
attention to Federal Trade Commission regulations that went into effect
in 1985. Prior to 1985 some states allowed debtors to agree in advance

24

25
26

27

28

This law contains no dollar limit, but does limit the amount of land that can be
included in the homestead. Fla. Const. art. X, § 4(a)(l).
15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2006). This law provides less protection against family law
claims. !d. at§ 1673(b)(2).
Hon. David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt: New Developments
and the Need for a New Direction, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 63, 66 n.22 ( 1998) (listing
four states that prohibit wage garnishment: Texas, Pennsylvania, South Carolina
and North Carolina, and pointing out that these states have low rates of bankruptcy
filings). Note that Florida also prohibits wage garnishment unless the debtor consents.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (2)(b) (West 2006).
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection wws, 77 Va. L.
Rev. 489 ( 1991 ). For a summary of the laws in effect around 1983, see C. F. Sirmans,
Real Estate Finance 83-85 (2d ed. 1989).
E.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. § 580b (West 2006).
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to confess their liability in a lawsuit, 29 to waive property exemptions,3° and
to irrevocably assign their wages to a creditorY Today FfC rules prohibit
each of these. 32 Similarly, debtors can no longer grant a security interest in
household goods except to a creditor who has lent the money used to purchase
these goods. 33 Finally, the FfC now limits the ability of a creditor to charge
late fees and requires that creditors provide notice of a cosigner's liability. 34
One recent paper suggests that the use of state collection proceedings
may be falling, at least relative to the use of bankruptcy. 35 Other research
suggests that few bankrupt debtors have been subject to garnishment or asset
seizure, 36 though this last point is subject to some disputeY Regardless, it
seems that many creditors rely heavily on non-judicial collection techniques
such as telephone calls and dunning letters that try to persuade the debtor to
repay. Federal law places some limits on these techniques, 38 but much of this
law does not apply if the original creditor retains its claim, 39 and debtors will
sometimes look to the laws provided by their individual state for protection. 40
The protections afforded by state and federal non-bankruptcy law are
not strong enough for some debtors, and they file for bankruptcy. About
seventy percent of bankrupt consumers choose Chapter 7, though this
percentage varies substantially from district to district. 41 Chapter 7 offers

29

Paul Ruschman et a!., Federal Trade Commission, Analysis of the legal
Environment Governing Consumer Credit Practices: Final Report, available at
http://www.paulruschmann.com/clips/commerce/ftc_report.pdf ( 1985).

30 /d.

.

/d.
FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.2(a)(l)-444.2(a)(3) (2005).
33 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4).
34 16 C.F.R. § 444.4.
31

32

See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections Proceedings: The Case of
the Missing Garnishments, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 603 (2006).
36 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, As We
Forgive Our Debtors 305 (1989) ("Less than 10% [of the debtors] had suffered a
property seizure or garnishment. Of more than 15,000 claims in our wage-earner
sample, only 616 creditors (about 4%) had filed suit prior to bankruptcy.").
37 See Visa U.S.A., Inc., 1998 Bankruptcy Debtor Survey (1998) (reporting that over
thirteen percent reported garnishment as the "last straw" before bankruptcy and
another fifty-nine percent cited other remedies as triggering bankruptcy).
38 Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1692 (West 2005).
39 15 U.S.C.A § 1692a(6) (excluding the original creditor from the definition of "debt
collector").
40 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 (West 2006); 2 Howard J. Alperin & Roland F.
Chase, Consumer Law, § 632 at 354 (collecting statutes).
41 In the first three quarters of 2004 over seventy percent of all non-business bankrupt
debtors opted for Chapter 7. See Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter,
35
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an immediate discharge of most debts, and though high-income debtors are
now subject to a means-test, 42 this was not true in 1983. 43 In exchange for the
discharge, the consumer is asked to forfeit any assets not made exempt by state
or federal law. The exemptions available in bankruptcy are generally the same
as those available in a state-law collections proceeding, 44 though some states
allow their debtors to choose certain bankruptcy-only exemptions when they
file. 45 Because the exemptions are generous relative to the assets of debtors
in financial distress, 46 less than five percent of bankrupt debtors forfeit assets
to their general creditors. 47 Debtors may, however, lose assets to their secured
creditors as Chapter 7 will, at most, delay foreclosure. The secured creditor
is entitled to interest during this delay as long as the debtor has any equity in
the collateral. 48 In theory, the debtor can redeem the collateral by paying the
lesser of the creditor's claim or the fair market value of the collateral, but few
debtors have the cash necessary to do so. 49
Debtors who wish to retain non-exempt assets or assets pledged as
collateral may fare better in Chapter 13. Debtors can retain assets pledged as

42
43

44

45

46

47

48
49

1990-2004, per Quarter, available at http://www.abiworld.org/Content/Content
Groups/Online_Resources !/Bankruptcy_Statistics3/Statistics_General/Non-business_
Bankruptcy _Filings_by_Chapter_(l990-2005).htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
Even the "substantial abuse" test of Section 707(b) was not added until 1984.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 312, 98 stat. 333 (1984 ).
11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000) (permitting debtors to choose the exemptions available
under state law).
About one-third of states allow their debtors to use the exemptions specified in
Section 522. See Richard M. Hynes, Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Political
Economy of State Property Exemptions, 47 J.L. & Econ. 19, 24 (2004). In addition,
some states have enacted exemptions that apply only in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140 (West 2005).
One study of bankrupt debtors in 1991 revealed that the median homeowner in
bankruptcy had just $5,500 in home equity. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt
221 (2000).
See, e.g., Executive Office for United States Trustees, United States Trustee Program:
Preliminary Report on Chapter 7 Asset Cases 1994 to 2000, at 7 (2001) (on file
with author) (explaining that "[h]istorically, the vast majority (about 95 to 97%) of
Chapter 7 cases yield no assets").
II U.S.C. § 506(b) (2005).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and
Creditors 293 (2001) ("For most debtors, section 722 might as well base redemption
on the debtor running a three minute mile.").
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collateral by promising to pay the lesser of the amount owed to the secured
creditor or the value of the collateral over three to five years. 5° Debtors can
retain non-exempt assets as well if they promise to repay an amount equal to
the value of these non-exempt assets. 5 1 Today the debtor may also be forced to
promise to repay an amount equal to her "projected disposable income" over
three years, 52 but this provision was not yet in effect in 1983.

II.

PRIOR LITERATURE

According to economic theory, laws that make it much more difficult for
a creditor to collect should have a measurable impact on credit markets. If
creditors find it more difficult or more expensive to collect unpaid debts,
the rate at which they must charge-off loans as uncollectible should rise.
These losses should make creditors less willing to lend at any given interest
rate if they are willing to lend at all. Limitations on debt collection should
reduce the supply of credit. A world in which households are not subject to
harsh collection methods should make default less painful and thus make
households willing to risk default by borrowing more at any given interest
rate. Limitations on debt collection should increase the demand for credit.
These supply and demand effects should, on balance, lead to a higher interest
rate, though their effect on the quantity borrowed is uncertain because they
work against each other.
At least since the 1970s and 1980s a number of papers have tested these
hypotheses by looking at non-bankruptcy collection laws and credit markets
in different states. 53 In one of the most recent papers in this field, Professor
Villegas uses the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance to examine the impact of
several restrictions on creditor remedies made more uniform by Federal Trade
Commission regulations that went into effect in 1985. 54 He focuses on the
effect that these restrictions had on the amount of short-term credit borrowed,
reasoning that restrictions that increase the amount borrowed are beneficial
because they make borrowing more attractive to consumers even after the
creditors passes on the additional costs that the restrictions impose. He found

50 II U.S.C. § I325(a)(5) (2005).
51 11 U.S.C. § I325(a)(4).
52 II U.S.C. § 1325(b).
53 For a review of this literature, see Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and

Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. I68 (2002).
54 See Villegas, supra note 12.
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that some restrictions reduced the amount borrowed55 while others increased
the amount borrowed. 56
Recently, consumer finance scholars have shifted their interest towards
bankruptcy, 57 and the empirical literature has focused on exemptions. Some
articles examine the market for mortgage loans, 58 or small business credit, 59
but of most relevance here is the first article to address the impact of property
exemptions on credit markets. In 1997, Gropp, Scholz and White used the
same data-set used by Professor Villegas, the 1983 Survey of Consumer
Finance, 60 to examine whether property exemptions affect credit markets.
They found that residents of states with larger exemptions are more likely to
( 1) have been turned down for credit or discouraged from applying for credit,
and (2) pay higher interest rates. They also found that the exemptions affect
the total amount borrowed, though the direction of this effect depends on the
amount of the consumer's assets. Larger exemptions lead to more borrowing
by households with significant assets and less borrowing by households
without significant assets.
Unlike most other studies of exemptions, Gropp, Scholz and White
explicitly test whether exemptions affect the rich and the poor
differently. 61 They find that exemptions (even marginal differences in very
large exemptions) have the most dramatic effect on households with less
than $7,885 of total assets. 62 For example, exemptions greatly affect the
interest rates paid by those with assets totaling less than $7,885, but have
no statistically significant effect on the rates paid by households with assets

55
56
57

58

59
60

61

62

/d. at 61 (finding that restrictions on security interests in household goods and
restrictions on garnishment increased borrowing).
/d. at 61 (finding that restrictions on wage assignment reduced borrowing).
There are some notable exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Amanda E. Dawsey &
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy (2002) (working paper), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3321.
See Berkowitz & Hynes, supra note II; Emily Y. Lin & Michelle J. White,
Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and Home Improvement Loans, 50 J.
Urban Econ. 138 (2001).
See Jeremy Berkowitz & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and Small Firms' Access
to Credit, 35(1) Rand J. Econ. 69 (2004).
Though this data-set is now quite dated, publicly available versions of more recent
surveys of consumer finance do not identify the state of residence of those surveyed.
One other study that tests for disparate effects is Fan & White, supra note II. This
study finds a similar puzzle to that found by Gropp, Scholz and White because it finds
that homestead exemptions significantly affect the probability that a non-homeowner
will start a business.
See Gropp, Scholz & White, supra note 8, at 230 n.23 (defining asset quartiles).
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totaling more than $48,535. 63 If a household has less than eight thousand
dollars in assets, it is puzzling why either the household or the creditor would
care if the exemptions were unlimited or "merely" $70,400. 64 In either case
the household could keep all that it has. Gropp, Scholz and White recognize
that very large exemptions should not affect the demand for credit of low asset
households, 65 but make no attempt to explain why large exemptions should
affect the supply of credit available to these same low asset households.

Ill.

WHY

Do LARGE EXEMPTIONS APPEAR TO AFFECT THE POOR?

There are at least seven possible explanations for why very large exemptions
appear to affect households without significant assets to exempt. First,
creditors may believe that generous exemptions will affect the behavior of
low-asset households even though this belief is mistaken. This belief will
lead them to charge too much in states with large exemptions and too little in
states with low exemptions. However, this explanation is inconsistent with
competitive lending markets. Mistaken creditors should quickly be driven
from the market as they will lose money when they charge too little and
will lose business when they try to charge too much.
Second, creditors may simply fail to recognize that a household has so
little in assets that it could exempt all of its wealth in nearly every state
in the union. This explanation is implausible, however, because households
with substantially greater assets have a much easier time obtaining credit,
suggesting that creditors are able to distinguish between the poor and the
affluent. Even if there is some uncertainty in the creditor's mind, it is
not plausible that a creditor will mistake someone with no home or other
significant assets for someone likely to exempt tens of thousands of dollars
of home equity.
A third possibility is that even if a household lacks sufficient assets at the
time of borrowing to use a generous exemption, the creditor may believe that
the household will acquire sufficient assets prior to default. The literature has
focused heavily on the ability of a debtor to plan for bankruptcy by acquiring
non-exempt assets just prior to filing. Most discussions of pre-bankruptcy

63 !d. at 244.
64 /d. (reporting that the largest observed value of an exemption with a dollar limit
was $70,400).
65 /d. at 231 ("In the extreme case of households that will never have assets, the
bankruptcy exemption will not affect demand for credit because there is (and will
be) nothing for these households to shelter in bankruptcy.").
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planning focus on debtors who sell non-exempt assets and use the proceeds
to purchase exempt assets. 66 The low asset households lack significant assets
of any type, however, and thus would have to borrow money to buy exempt
assets. This task is risky because bankruptcy courts view such borrowing as
a "badge of fraud" and may deny the debtor's discharge. 67 Courts also look
askance at debtors who appear too greedy by gathering large sums of money
on the eve of filing, 68 thereby reducing the likelihood that low asset households
could accumulate the sums necessary to make the exemption limits relevant.
Aside from the legal limitations, lenders will be reluctant to lend large sums
on an unsecured basis to a debtor in financial distress. A review of the case
law produces few, if any, instances of debtors who successfully borrow very
large amounts in order to accumulate exempt property prior to discharge. In
addition, if one truly believed that there were no effective legal or practical
limits on pre-bankruptcy planning, then it would be hard to understand why
any differences in exemptions would be relevant. The debtor's home state
exemptions would not matter if the warm sands and unlimited exemptions of
Florida and Texas await. 69
The household may acquire sufficient assets after incurring the debt but
prior to the eve of default. Unless the term of the loan is extremely long,
however, it is implausible that many low asset debtors would accumulate
the tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars of wealth necessary to make
the "unlimited" exemptions relevant. Thus, it is quite surprising that Gropp,
Scholz and White found that exemptions have a marked effect on the terms
of moderate-length loans, such as automobile loans, that are offered to the
poor. 70 In addition, prior research suggests that few bankrupt debtors are able

66

67
68

69

70

See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert
Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 235 (1995).
14 Collier on Bankruptcy 49 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996 & Supp.
2001).
In re Zauhar, 10 B.R. 154, 157 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) ("There is a principle of too
much; phrased colloquially, when a pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.") (quoting
Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146, 1154 (lOth Cir. 1979)).
In 2005, Congress enacted legislation that set residency requirements for exemptions.
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, § 307, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
Perhaps mortgages are of sufficient length to allow a small number of low asset
households to accumulate sufficient assets. However, there are strong theoretical
reasons to believe that mortgage lenders will not be harmed by large homestead
exemptions. Because the mortgage is effectively senior to the homestead exemption,
the exemption only affects the mortgage lender through transactions costs. See
Berkowitz & Hynes, supra note II. The effect of the transactions costs is theoretically
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to exempt significant assets. One study suggests that the median home equity
exempted by homeowners in bankruptcy in 1991 was just $5,500 despite the
fact that every state in the study allowed households to exempt substantially
more than this amount, and the median home equity for all United States
households (including the solvent) was $43,078. 71
A fourth possible explanation is that the results are caused by the timing
of the measurement of assets. The Survey of Consumer Finance records the
household's assets at the time of the survey, after the household has made
its borrowing decisions. A household that has borrowed less or has been
denied credit will have less cash with which to buy assets, meaning that
the dependent variables may affect at least one independent variable, the
household's assets. 72 For example, households that cannot obtain a mortgage
are unlikely to buy a home and their total assets will be lower. This effect may
cause exemptions to appear to affect the poor most strongly by concentrating
those who have been denied credit at the bottom of the asset distribution.
To test the significance of this problem, this essay will use household
income as a proxy for household wealth. Household income is strongly

ambiguous, as large homestead exemptions may allow the household to avoid paying
unsecured debt and thus be better able to repay the mortgage, but might also cause
the household to file for bankruptcy and thus delay a foreclosure. Note, however, that
a large homestead exemption would only cause the household to file for bankruptcy
if the household has home equity to exempt. In this case, the mortgage lender is
entitled to interest to compensate for the delay in foreclosure. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(2005). The empirical literature on this question is mixed with one study finding that
larger homestead exemptions decrease the probability that a mortgage application
will be denied and another finding that large exemptions increase this probability.
See Berkowitz & Hynes, supra note 11; Lin & White, supra note 58.
71 See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 46, at 221. This study included
bankrupt debtors in California (homestead exemption of $50,000 for a single
individual and $75,000 for a married couple), Illinois (homestead exemption of
$7,500 for a single individual and $15,000 for a married couple), Pennsylvania
(allowed use of federal exemptions, $7,500 for a single individual and $15,000 for a
married couple), Tennesee ($5,000 for a single individual and $7,500 for a married
couple) and Texas (no dollar limit on the homestead exemption).
72 In their article, Gropp, Scholz and White define total assets as the sum of financial
assets and net equity in real assets such as the home. See Gropp, Scholz & White,
supra note 8, at 230 n.23. This presents a slightly different endogeneity problem
because a household that obtains a home equity Joan for a vacation will reduce
its assets. However, correspondence with the authors suggests that this description
was in error and that the actual variable used contains the total value of real assets
regardless of the amount of debt secured by such assets. The summary statistics that
they report suggest that this is likely the case. Both definitions were tried, and the
difference did not materially affect the results.
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correlated with household wealth but should be less affected by the amount
of debt that the debtor incurs. Debt may, of course, have some effect on the
household's income. Individuals with significant debt may choose to work
harder so that they can earn more income to repay this debt. 73 Households
that use the added debt to purchase business assets may be able to earn a higher
income. The magnitude of these effects should be far less than the effect on
household assets, and it is unlikely that this effect should be sufficiently large
to shift households into another income quartile.
A fifth possible reason is that exemptions may affect the perceived
generosity of debt relief even if they have no effect on the actual relief
offered to low asset households. For example, low asset households who
live in states with very large exemptions may be more likely to see news
stories of celebrities retaining mansions in bankruptcy and may thus be more
likely to realize that bankruptcy can help them escape their debts. Even if
exemptions do not affect the amount collected from low asset debtors in
bankruptcy (these debtors never have non-exempt assets), the exemptions
may affect the willingness of low asset debtors to declare bankruptcy. Fearing
these additional defaults, lenders may be less willing to lend to the poor
when exemptions are generous. This explanation is theoretically possible,
but the empirical support for a relationship between exemptions and filings
is mixed at best. Some studies find a positive relationship between the
bankruptcy filing rate and the generosity of exemptions, 74 but many others

To the extent that a debt must be repaid, a worker keeps the last dollar that she
earns and the debt does not change the price of leisure relative to work; there is
no substitution effect. The debt does, however, make the worker less wealthy and
thus may cause the worker to work more because she values each dollar of income
more highly. Of course, if it becomes obvious that the debt will never be repaid
and any additional money earned will simply be used to repay the creditor, the
incentive to work will decline. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy in
a Non-Optimal World, 44 B.C. L. Rev. I, 23-26.
74 See, e.g., Michell J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 Ind. L.J. I (1987); Andreas Lehnert & Dean M.
Maki, Consumption, Debt and Portfolio Choice: Testing the Effect of Bankruptcy
Law (2002) (Working Paper, Federal Reserve Board of Governors), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200214/200214.pap.pdf. A study
conducted by this author found that under some specifications more generous
exemptions did correlate with higher filing rates but under other specifications they
did not. See Richard Hynes, Three Essays on Consumer Bankruptcy and Exemptions
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with
author). Most studies focus on the effect of exemptions on the bankruptcy filing
rate, but one study was able to examine the effect on the default rate and found that

73
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find no relationship or even a negative relationship. 75 Moreover, these studies
also fail to explore whether generous exemptions have a disparate effect on
those who actually have assets to exempt. 76
A sixth possible explanation for the disproportionate effect on low asset
debtors is that other debtors are so unlikely to default that the effect of
the exemptions cannot be measured. That is, the exemptions may affect the
behavior of households with significant assets, but we cannot measure this
effect with the data that we have. Note, however, that this can serve as at
most a partial explanation, as it does not explain why exemptions affect
those with nothing to exempt. In addition, this explanation runs counter

75

76

more generous exemptions are correlated with higher default rates. See Dawsey &
Ausubel, supra note 57.
See, e.g., Vincent P. Apilado et a!., Personal Bankruptcies, 7 J. Legal Stud. 371
(1978) (finding mixed results when testing for a link between exemptions and the
filing rate prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978); Francis
H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. Legal Stud. 187
(1998); Scott Fay et a!., The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 Am. Econ. Rev.
706, 713-14 (2002) (finding no relationship between an individual's non-exempt
assets and the likelihood that the individual will file for bankruptcy); Richard L.
Peterson & Kiyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy Filings Before and After Implementation of
the Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. Econ. & Bus. 95 ( 1984 ); Alden F. Shiers & Daniel
P. Williamson, Nonbusiness Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical Results,
21 J. Consumer Aff. 277 (1987) (finding that generous exemptions lead to lower
filing rates and arguing that this is due to greater care exerted by lenders); Phillip
Shuchman & Thomas L. Rhorer, Personal Bankruptcy Data for Opt-Out Hearings
and Other Purposes, 56 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1 ( 1982) (finding that states with very large
exemptions sometimes had low bankruptcy filing rates and states that opted out of
the federal bankruptcy exemptions sometimes had very high filing rates); Teresa
A. Sullivan, Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Elizabeth Warren, Consumer Debtors Ten
Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 121, 123 (1994) ("we could find no support for the economists' claims
of debtors responding in a predictable fashion to the economic incentives created
by property exemptions"); Lawrence A. Weiss et a!., An Analysis of State-Wide
Variation in Bankruptcy Rates in the United States, 17 Bankr. Dev. J. 407 (2001);
William J. Woodward, Jr. & Richard S. Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to
Voluntary Bankruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 53 (1983) (finding
that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did not lead to a significantly greater
increase in filings in states that both allowed the use of these exemptions and had
smaller exemptions available outside of bankruptcy).
Some more recent studies have tried to account for this effect by measuring the
"benefit" of filing for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Fay et a!., supra note 75, at 708-09.
This definition subtracts the debtor's non-exempt assets from total debt, and thus it
is impossible to discern the effect of the exemptions from the effect of a high level
of debt.
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to empirical studies that suggest that bankruptcy is largely a middle class
phenomenon. 77
Finally, the coefficients on the exemptions variables may not measure
the importance of exemptions. Rather, they may measure the importance
of variables that are correlated with exemptions but more plausibly have a
disproportionate effect on the poor. The laws studied by Professor Villegas
(restrictions on security interests in household goods, wage assignments,
etc.) provide obvious candidates for inclusion in the regressions. They do
not, however, exhaust the list of differences in state collection laws or
practice. Empirical studies of exemptions routinely exclude exemptions of
low-value assets such as clothing or furniture because these exemptions
often contain no explicit limits and are difficult to value. 78 It is difficult to
believe that bankruptcy trustees seize these items, but it is at least possible
that individual creditors threaten to seize these items in a state proceeding to
convince the debtor that a failure to pay will have dire consequences.
A full account of all laws that affect credit markets would include more
variables than are possible to test with the data available, and some elements
of the law cannot be easily reduced to a variable. For example, scholars
report persistent and significant differences in local bankruptcy practice that
cannot be explained by economic or legal factors. 79 Judges and the local bar
are said to use the discretion afforded to them to significantly shape bankruptcy
practice according to their preferences. Non-bankruptcy collection law may
afford judges and attorneys similar discretion. For example, several states
allow judges to increase the amount exempt from wage garnishment if the
debtor needs more income to support a family. 80
Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to measure these other variables
directly, and the proxies offered by the literature (the bankruptcy filing rate
or the choice of bankruptcy chapter) are sometimes interpreted to represent
other factors such as the stigma of bankruptcy or the willingness of debtors
to file. 81 This essay examines these proxies, but also searches for alternative
proxies that assume that politics plays a role in these omitted variables. 82 In

See, e.g., Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 46.
See, e.g., Gropp, Scholz & White., supra note 8, at 227 n.20.
79 See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 15.
80 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 26-2-106, 26-2-107 (2005).
81 See, e.g., Gross & Souleles, supra note 16.
82 Prior empirical evidence on the influence of political ideology on debtor-creditor
law is mixed. Hynes, Malani and Posner found little evidence that ideology affects
a state's choice of exemptions. See Hynes, Malani & Posner, supra note 45.
This study did, however, find that a state's ideology influenced its reaction to
opt-out of the federal exemptions created in 1978. !d. at 36. In addition, Nunez &
77
78
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addition to picking up small differences in the law, politics may play a role in
explaining judicial preferences. In many states judges are elected; in others
they are appointed by elected officials. Because liberal members of Congress
were more likely to oppose the recent bankruptcy reforms, 83 one might posit
that liberal states would be friendlier to debtors. However, some states, like
Florida and Texas, have a strong reputation for being "debtor friendly" but not
for being liberal; perhaps their debt relief represents the populism of an earlier
era. As a result, this essay will include two proxies for politics: a measure of
how liberal a state is and a measure of the level of populism at the beginning
of the twentieth century.

IV.

EMPIRICAL TESTS

Most of the data used in this essay is drawn from the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finance, which provides detailed financial information on 3,665
households from 37 states and the District of Columbia. 84 The Survey
of Consumer Finance also provides economic information about the area in
which the household is located, such as the county unemployment rate and the
degree of concentration in the local banking market.
Exemption laws are quite complicated, and any measure of their generosity
requires several debatable assumptions. 85 As a result, few studies use the same
method of evaluation. 86 This article generally uses the variables defined by

83
84

85

86

Rosenthal report that ideology helps explain the votes of members of Congress on
recent consumer bankruptcy legislation. See Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal,
Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor
Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 527 (2004).
See Nunez & Rosenthal, supra note 82.
In total the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance includes 4,262 households. Of these,
however, 438 are from a high-income sample that does not indicate the state of
residence of the household and 159 households are excluded from the Federal
Reserve's area probability sample due to missing data. A full description of this
data-set can be found on-line. See Robert B. Avery & Gregory E. Elliehausen,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/83/codebk83.txt (last revision Feb. 15,
1990).
For example, Professors Gropp, Scholz and White seem to assume that married
individuals could not each claim the state exemptions unless there is a state law that
explicitly said that they could. Others would assume that married individuals could
each claim exemptions unless there is a state law that says that they cannot.
Compare Gropp, Scholz & White, supra note 8 (considering both homestead and
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Gropp, Scholz and White, 87 and tests for robustness by using the exemption
measures used by Hynes, Mal ani and Posner, 88 and the homestead exemptions
of 1920. 89 This last measure provides a useful test because the availability
of credit could, in theory, .have an effect on the exemptions chosen by a
legislature, and thus the direction of causation could be uncertain. By contrast,
current credit markets should have no effect on the exemptions available
several generations ago, and yet inertia insures that today's exemptions are
highly correlated with those of the past. 90
Information on the usury limits in place around 1983 were obtained from the
Financial Publishing Company. 91 To capture the time and expense of seizing
collateral, estimates of the time it took to foreclose on a mortgage around 1983

87

88

89

90
91

personal property exemptions), with Fan & White, supra note 11, at 553 (considering
only homestead exemptions).
Gropp, Scholz and White added up the value of the homestead, personal property,
tools of the trade, automobile and wildcard exemptions and doubled the sum if the
household included a married couple and they believed the state allowed married
couples of each claim an exemption. Gropp, Scholz & White, supra note 8, at
227. If any exemption was unlimited, the state was treated as offering unlimited
exemptions. Finally, they used the value of the federal exemptions if this was greater.
/d. at 226-29.
See Hynes, Malani & Posner, supra note 45; Hynes, Malani and Posner included the
same exemptions as Gropp, Scholz and White, but added furniture and followed the
legal literature in assuming that married debtors could double unless a state explicitly
said that they could not. In addition, there are some discrepancies between the legal
research conducted by Hynes, Malani and Posner and that conducted by Gropp,
Scholz and White. Because the research of Hynes, Malani and Posner uncovered
so many personal property exemptions (typically jewelry or furniture) that did not
specify a dollar value, and because an unlimited homestead exemption is obviously
of much greater value than an unlimited automobile exemption, exemptions were
capped at the second highest observed. To test for robustness, Hynes, Malani and
Posner also tried a narrower definition of personal property similar to that used by
Gropp, Scholz and White. Finally, the exemptions of Hynes, Malani and Posner
allow for the measurement of the exemptions available to a debtor who does not
own a home; one cannot simply subject the homestead exemption because some
(but not all) states allow the debtor to use some portion of the homestead exemption
toward other property. Fortunately, the Hynes, Malani & Posner exemptions are
highly correlated with the Gropp, Scholz & White exemptions.
See Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemptions in the United States:
Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-80, 80 J. Am. Hist.
470 ( 1993). Following Gropp, Scholz & White, states with "unlimited" exemptions
were set at zero and a separate dummy variable was created for these states.
See Hynes, Malani & Posner, supra note 45.
Fin. Publ'g Co., The Cost of Personal Borrowing in the United States (Charles H.
Gushee ed., 1983).
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were obtained from the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation. 92 Political
variables were obtained from the political science literature. 93 Other collection
limitations, including restrictions on wage assignments and security interests in
household goods are drawn from the same Federal Trade Commission survey
used by Professor Villegas. 94 Because a few errors were noted in this survey's
summary of garnishment laws, 95 a new survey was conducted using the
annotated code of each state. The number of bankruptcy filings per thousand
people and the percentage of bankruptcies filed under Chapter 13 were taken
from the American Bankruptcy Institute. Table 1 presents a summary of these
collection laws and the variables used. Table 2 presents summary statistics for
the variables used in the regressions.
A. Does Debt Relief Cause Households to Be Credit Constrained?
This essay first examines the probability that a household will be credit
constrained. Following Gropp, Scholz and White, a household is deemed
credit constrained if it is discouraged from borrowing because it believes
that it would be denied credit or if it is actually denied credit and does not
successfully reapply for the same or greater amount of credit from another
source. Six hundred thirty-one households met this definition. 96
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of a probit regression (with
robust standard errors clustered by state) that replicates Gropp, Scholz and
White's basic finding that households in states with larger exemptions are
more likely to be credit constrained than those with smaller exemptions. 97

92 Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation, Foreclosure-Redemption Summary
( 1983), reprinted in C. F. Sirmans, Real Estate Finance 83-85 (2d ed. 1989).
93 Estimates of the ideology of the population of each state was taken from Robert S.
Erikson et a!., Statehouse Democracy, Public Opinion and Policy in the American
States 15-16 (1995). The percentage vote for Williams Jennings Bryan in 1900 can
be found in CQ Press, Presidential Elections 1789-2000, at 131 (2002).
94 See Ruschman et a!., supra note 29. Other variables from this study that were
employed by Professor Villegas were excluded from the reported regressions of
this essay because they were deemed unlikely to be important or had very little
state variation. These variables included restrictions on confession of judgment,
pyramiding of late charges, attorney's fees, wage assignments, deficiency judgments
and waivers of exemptions.
95 For example, the report did not list Pennsylvania and South Carolina as prohibiting
garnishment.
96 If one does not account for the possibility that the household can reapply for credit,
727 households are debt constrained. The results of this essay are not sensitive to
this specification.
97 A number of variables included in the regression are excluded from Table I to
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In short, their result is robust against the inclusion of other limitations on debt
collection, usury ceilings, and proxies for the legal culture of each state. 98 As
in their paper, the exemption variable is divided into quartiles with the largest
quartile representing unlimited exemptions and the smallest quartile omitted
from the regression. The coefficients on the exemption quartiles are positive,
suggesting that households which have access to these exemptions face a
larger probability of being credit constrained than those who face the lowest
exemptions. As in Gropp, Scholz and White's study, only the coefficient on
the unlimited exemptions is statistically significant at the ten percent level.
Column 2 demonstrates that the general result is robust against the measure of
exemptions employed by Hynes, Malani and Posner, and an omitted regression
found the results robust against the use of the homestead exemption of 1920. 99
Unfortunately, the results are too consistent with those of Gropp, Scholz
and White, and the finding of a disproportionate impact on the poor remains.
Though Gropp, Scholz and White did not formally test whether larger
exemptions substantially increase the probability that a low asset household
will be credit constrained, they provide a graph that shows that low asset
households in states with unlimited exemptions face a higher probability of
being credit constrained than low asset households in states with very small
exemptions. 100 To test the disparate impact on rich and poor more formally,
this essay employs the same technique as used by Gropp, Scholz and White in
their examination of the effect of exemptions on total borrowing and interest

save space. All regressions also contained the following variables: age of head
of household, age of head of household squared, years of schooling completed,
household income, household income squared, total household assets, a dummy for
a married head of household, persons in household, dummy for non-white head of
household, dummy for household located in Northeast, Midwest, South, Rural area,
average income of household's profession, herfindahl index for financial institutions
(a measure of market concentration), years working at current employer, statewide
branch banking, no multi-state bank holding companies, county unemployment
and a constant. Complete results are available from the author.
98
Excluding the bankruptcy filing rate and the percentage of bankruptcy filings
in Chapter 13 does not materially affect the results. The coefficients on the
other variables remain substantially the same and the same coefficients remain
statistically significant. These variables are excluded from most models because
large bankruptcy exemptions are alleged to raise the interest rate and cause more
debtors to choose Chapter 7. Thus, including these variables in the regression could
bias the results against finding a significant effect on exemptions.
99 The coefficient on the continuous measure of this exemption was positive and
significant at the one percent level; the coefficient on the dummy for an unlimited
exemption was positive but is not statistically significant.
I 00 See Gropp, Scholz & White, supra note 7, at 231.

514

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 7:493

rates. Households are divided into four quartiles based on their total assets.
A dummy for each quartile is then crossed with the exemptions expressed as
a continuous variable (with unlimited exemptions set equal to zero) and then
also crossed with a dummy variable equal to one if the state offers an unlimited
exemption. Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results.
Column 4 suggests that exemptions only increase the likelihood that
households with very low assets will be credit constrained; the coefficient
on exemptions is positive and significant only for households with the least
amount of assets. In fact, larger exemptions seem to reduce the likelihood that
wealthier households (those in the third and fourth quartile) will be denied
credit. Unfortunately, these disparate effects are robust against different
specifications of exemptions, 101 different cut-offs for asset quartiles, 102 and
different measures of assets. 103 Column 5 demonstrates that this result is even
robust against the use of income quartiles as a proxy for asset quartiles, 104
suggesting that the puzzle is not caused by the timing of the measurement of
assets.
Not only do the new variables fail to resolve this puzzle, they also
perform fairly poorly as an explanation for why some households are credit
constrained. Consistent with theory, the coefficient on wage assignment
is positive and statistically significant in every reported regression. The
coefficient on ideology is also positive and significant in five of the six
regressions, suggesting that politics may play a role in setting some aspects
of debtor-creditor law that are not captured by the other variables. However,
the bankruptcy statistics and most of the other legal variables are not
significant, and the coefficient on the restriction of security interests in
household goods has the "wrong" sign. One possible explanation is that
lenders who do not use this remedy are more likely to deny credit because

This result is robust against the use of exemptions measured by Hynes, Malani and
Posner and the homestead exemptions of 1920.
102 The quartile breaks supplied by Gropp, Scholz and White do not precisely match
the quartile breaks found when I recreated their measure of assets. This may be
due to a slight difference in the way in which total assets are calculated or small
changes in the data-set in the years since they completed their study. Though I
tried to follow their definition, the mean of Total Assets calculated in this essay is
significantly different from that reported by Gropp, Scholz and White. Using the
corrected quartile breaks did not make a meaningful difference.
103 For example, the results did not change markedly when total home equity was used
instead of home value.
I 04 Column 5 also includes the bankruptcy filing rate and the percentage of bankruptcies
per thousand people. Column 5 would not materially change if these variables were
excluded.
101
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they are at a disadvantage compared to those who are willing to use this
remedy. It is also possible, however, that this result represents an error in
the data 105 or co-linearity with other variables.

B. Does Debt Relief Lead to Higher Interest Rates?
Economic theory predicts that generous debt relief should lead to higher
interest rates by reducing the supply of credit and increasing demand for
credit. Table 4 presents the results of Heckit regressions that test this result
using a sample of households that purchased a car in 1982 or in the first
quarter of 1983 and financed their purchase with a loan from a commercial
bank, savings and loan or credit union. As in Gropp, Scholz and White's
study, the first stage of the Heckit model seeks to explain which households
purchase a car with credit obtained from one of the specified financial
institutions, while the second stage seeks to explain the interest rate that
they pay.
Though Model 1 of Table 4 includes a number of additional variables
(other limitations on debt collection and political variables) not found
in Gropp, Scholz and White's research, and excludes dummy variables
representing the quarter in which the car was purchased from the selection
stage of the Heckit model, 106 the results are generally the same. Larger
exemptions seem to lead to higher interest rates and reduced probability of
borrowing for those with few assets, but do not have a similar effect on those
with sufficient assets to make use of the exemptions. Models 2 and 3 show
that this result is robust against the use of income quartiles and the inclusion
of bankruptcy statistics. An omitted regression found similar results when
exemptions were measured in other ways.
Given the nature of the data, it is somewhat surprising that any of the
variables had an effect on the interest rate. The unprocessed version of
the Survey of Consumer Finance contains few observations in which the
appropriate interest rate was reported; most interest rates were imputed.
Though some interest rates may have been imputed by using the frequency
and size of payments, the Federal Reserve reports that other rates were set

Note that an examination of garnishment laws revealed several errors in the FTC
survey. See supra note 95. The FTC Survey's results for restrictions on security
interests in household goods was not rechecked.
106 As in Gropp, Scholz & White, dummy variables are employed in the interest rate
stage to control for the quarter in which the automobile was purchased. Unlike
Gropp, Scholz & White, these dummies are excluded from the selection stage
because this stage is designed to determine if the household purchases a car at all.
I05

516

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 7:493

by adding an error term to the average national interest rate on automobile
loans reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 107 No attempt was made to
adjust the interest rate for state-specific conditions. For example, no account
was taken of a state's usury ceiling, and many observations reflect rates well
in excess of the legal limit at the time. 108 In short, future research should
readdress the issue using better data.

C. Amount Borrowed
Finally, consider the effect of the debt relief laws on the amount borrowed.
Professor Villegas focused primarily on this question, reasoning that
beneficial laws would increase borrowing and harmful laws would decrease
borrowing. 109 Yet this test is not dispositive. Some have argued that debtors
fail to consider debt relief laws when deciding how much to borrow and that
therefore almost any decline in debt relief will increase borrowing. 110 Even if
this theory is incorrect and the only market failure is the cost of contracting, a
beneficial law could lead to a decline in borrowing. 111 Still, the effect on total
borrowing may prove somewhat instructive for policy analysis, and so this
essay briefly presents the results of a basic estimation.
Table 5 presents the results of a Heckit model of the total amount borrowed
by a family. 112 The results are consistent with those of Gropp, Scholz and
White. Exemptions seem to lower the amount borrowed by lower income
households and reduce the probability that they will borrow anything at all.
By contrast, exemptions seem to increase borrowing by wealthier households.

Avery & Elliehausen, supra note 84.
This could also be due to evasion of state usury restrictions. For example, national
banks located outside a state need not follow the state's usury limit. See Marguette
Nat'! Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
109 See Villegas, supra note 12.
110 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and
Bankruptcy, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 249, 268-69 (1997). For a critique of these
arguments, see Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU
L. Rev. 127.
Ill See Hynes & Posner, supra note 53, at 198-99.
112 Gropp, Scholz and White use a more complicated model that separates the selection
effect into two to determine if (1) the households desire to incur any debt, and (2)
if the households are credit constrained. This essay uses the more simple model
both because of convenience (the statistical package used did not contain the more
complicated model) and because all of the factors in Gropp, Scholz and White's
regressions that determine how much a household borrows also determine whether
the household borrows.
107
108
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This result is robust against different measures of the exemption and the use
of income as a proxy for assets. Note that other limits on debt collection
seem to have some effect on the amount borrowed as does the ideology
variable, suggesting that there are important legal or political factors that are
not captured by previous measures of the ability of a creditor to collect.

V.

CONCLUSION

Economists commonly assert that debt relief comes at a cost. Laws that
provide debt relief do so by limiting the ability of creditors to collect, and thus
these laws should make creditors less willing to lend. Professors Gropp,
Scholz and White supply important empirical support for this claim by
demonstrating that households in states with larger bankruptcy exemptions
pay higher interest rates and are more likely to be denied credit. This essay
tests whether their results are robust against the inclusion of other laws that
limit debt collection, and finds that they are.
Unfortunately, the results of this essay are too consistent with those found
by Gropp, Scholz and White, and an important puzzle remains. Though
general regressions yield coefficients consistent with theory, regressions that
try to differentiate the effect that exemptions have on different classes imply
that the exemptions have the greatest effect on those who should be affected
the least, those without the assets necessary to make marginal differences
in exemptions relevant. One possible explanation for this puzzle is that the
coefficients on exemptions are picking up the effects of other variables that
are correlated with exemptions. Unfortunately, however, this essay could
not identify these other variables, and further research is needed. Until such
time, however, policy-makers should be cautious in interpreting studies of
exemptions as implying that marginal changes in exemptions will have a
significant impact on credit markets.
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Table 1: Summary of Collection Laws
Definition
Equals zero if a state does not prohibit
irrevocable wage assignments for all or a
large part of consumer credit.
Equals zero if a state does not prohibit
nonpurchase money security interest in
household goods for all or a large part of
consumer credit.

States*
Wageasg=O: AZ, AR, CT, FL,
GA, IL, KY, LA, MA, MN,
MS, NE, NJ, NY, SD, TN
Hldgds-0: AL, AR, FL, IL,
KY, LA, ME, MI, MS, NE,
NJ, PA, SO, TN, TX

Source
FTC Report

Garnisht=l: AL, FL, IL, lA,
MO, NE, NJ, NY, NC, PA,
SC, SD, TX, WV

State statutes

Usury
ceiling

Equals one if a state provides limitations on
garnishment that are substantially more
restrictive than federal law. States that
allowed debtors to exempt forty times the
minimum wage rather than thirty were not
included in this category.
Equals one if a state has usury limits on all or
a substantial portion of consumer credit

Usury=O: AZ, IL, NJ, NY,
OR, SD, VA.

The Cost of
Personal
Borrowing in the

Foreclosure
takes longer
than six
months

Equals one if a mortgage creditor cannot
foreclose on a property and extinguish any
redemption rights within an average of six
months

Sixmo-1: AZ, AK, CA, CO,
DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD,
MA, MS, MO, NE, NY, NC,
OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, UT,
VA,WV

C.F. Sirmans,
Real Estate
Finance

Variable
Restricts
wage
assignment
Restricts
security
interests in
household
goods
Restricts
wage
garnishment

FTC Report

u.s.

*

The following states were either not included in the Survey of Consumer Finance or
were missing significant data: AK, DE, DC, HI, ID, KS, MT, NV, NH, NM, ND, RI,
VT, WY.

2006]

519

Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households

Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Dummy for credit constrained
Interest rate x I 0
Natural log of total debt (conditional on
any debt)
2d exemption quartile
3d exemption quartile
Unlimited exemption (.. Unlimited'')
Combined exemptions (in $10,000)
(exemption) x dummy variable for I st
quartile of asset distribution
Exemption x 2d asset quartile
Exemption x 3d asset quartile
Exemption x 4th asset quartile
Unlimited x I st asset quartile
Unlimited x 2d asset quartile
Unlimited x 3d asset quartile
Unlimited x 4th asset quartile
Bankruptcies per thousand
Percent of bankruptcies in Chapter 13
Ideology
Percent vote for Bryan in 1900
Restricts wage garnishment
Restricts wage assignment
Restricts security interests in household
_goods
Foreclosure takes longer than six months
Usury ceiling
Age of head of household (HOH) (in I 00)
Age squared
Years of education of HOH
Household income (in ten thousands)
Income squared
Total assets (in millions)
Married dummy
Family_ size
Nonwhite dummy
HOH is male dummy
Northeast dummy
Midwest dummy
South dummy
Rural dummy
Avg. income of household's profession (in
ten thousands)
Herfindahl index for financial institutions
in area (in thousands)
Years working at current employer
Statewide branch banking
No multibank holding companies in state
County unemployment xI 0
HOH a high school graduate
HOH has some college
HOH a college graduate
Thinks credit is a bad idea

Obs
3654
407
2562

Mean
0.173
170
8.81

Std. Dev.
0.378
43.5
1.94

3665
3665
3665
3665

0.299
0.203
0.187
0.528

3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3659
3565
3583
3583
3583

2.20

Max.
I
299
14.04

0.458
0.402
0.390
1.21

0
0
0
0

I
I
I
6.35

0.379
0.439
0.509
0.065
0.041
0.039
0.044
1.35
30.45
-12.8
0.497
0.432
0.550
0.564

1.01
1.08
1.20
0.246
0.199
0.194
0.204
.6001
16.63
7.01
0.131
0.495
0.498
0.496

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
.47
4
-28
0.352
0
0
0

6.35
6.35
6.35
I
I
I
I
2.91
71
-0.8
0.921
I
I
I

3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665

0.696
0.787
0.466
0.247
12.1
2.56
15.1
0.069
0.612
2.71
0.172
0.738
0.201
0.277
0.352
0.401
2.05

0.460
0.410
0.173
0.175
3.28
2.93
84.7
0.168
0.487
1.53
0.377
0.4397
0.401
0.448
0.478
0.490
5.30

0
0
0.16
0.256
0
-2.41
1.6e-07
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
I
0.98
0.96
17
53.0
2813
5.71
I
13
I
I
I
I
I
I
130

3665

1.38

1.01

0

4.92

3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3665
3634

6.66
.446
.143
96.3
0.323
0.169
0.217
0.241

9.02
0.497
0.350
36.1
0.468
0.375
0.412
0.428

0
0
0
25
0
0
0
0

55
I
I
224
I
I
I
I

Min.

0
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Table 3: Probit Model of the Probability of Being Credit Constrained
(Robust p values in brackets; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
significant at 1%)
I

2d exemption_quartile (GSW)
3d exemption quartile (GSW)
Unlimited Exemptions (GSW)

Quartile
0.119
[0.359]
0.095
[0.356]
0.265
[0.014]**

Homeowner (broad) exemptions ($1 0,000)

2

3

4

5

HMP

GSWx
asset quart

GSWx
inc. quart

HMPx
inc. quart.

0.150
[0.000]***
0.031
[0.495]
-0.042
[0.096]*
-0.067
[0.1601
0.454
[0.0001***
0.322
[0.0331**
0.099
[0.4541
-0.165
[0.3191

O.D78
[0.015]**
-0.023
[0.611]
-0.014
[0.549]
-0.037
[0.2451
0.382
[0.0041***
0.079
[0.6151
0.304
[0.0281**
0.170
[0.3961
0.018
[0.7771
0.002
[0.193]
0.011
[0.041]**
-0.149
[0.567]
0.067
[0.453]
0.127
[0.054]*
-0.069
[0.406]
0.053
[0.532]
0.032
[0.6981
3479

0.017
[0.011]**
-0.005
[0.567]
0.016
[0.000]***
0.010
[0.3661

0.010
[O.ot 8]**

Exemption x dummy variable for I st quartile of
asset/income distribution
Exemption x 2d asset/income quartile
Exemption x 3d asset/income quartile
Exemption x 4th asset/income quartile
Unlimited x I st asset/income quartile
Unlimited x 2d asset/income quartile
Unlimited x 3d asset/income quartile
Unlimited x 4th asset/income quartile
Non-business bankruptcies per I 000
Percenta~e

ldeolo~y

Chapter 13 bankruptcies

(liberal is

lar~er)

Percent vote for Bryan in 1900
Restricts garnishment
Restricts wage assignment
Restricts security interests in household goods
Foreclosure takes longer than six months
Usury ceiling
Observations
Other GSW variables omitted from table.

***

0.027
[0.6851
0.001
[0.5241
0.012
[0.023]**
-0.080
[0.785]
0.084
[0.390]
0.111
[0.075]*
-0.080
[0.327]
0.047
[0.616]
0.071
[0.383]
3479

0.011
[0.031]**
-0.017
[0.949]
0.064
[0.349]
0.099
[0.091]*
-0.114
[0.085]*
0.050
[0.520]
0.045
[0.5801
3479

0.007
[0.229]
-0.305
[0.168]
0.109
[0.143]
0.125
[0.048]**
-0.080
[0.299]
0.002
[0.981]
0.012
[0.865]
3479

0.010
[0.049]**
-0.053
[0.839]
0.060
[0.387]
0.098
[0.091]*
-0.109
[0.101]
0.048
[0.5521
0.039
[0.6351
3479
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Table 4: Heckit Selection Model of Interest Rates
(Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1 o/o)
Model I (Asset)
Selection
Rate
Exemption x dummy variable for
I st quartile of asset/income
distribution
Exemption x 2d asset/income
quartile
Exemption x 3d asset/income
quartile
Exemption x 4th asset/income
quartile
Unlimited x I st asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 2d asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 3d asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 4th asset/inc quartile

Model 2 (Income)
Rate
Selection

0.146
[0.9681

-0.118
[0.0061***

-2.057
[0.6161

-0.126
[0.009]***

-0.037
[0.9931

-0.106
[0.0211**

-0.367
[0.8711

-0.001
[0.970]

-2.455
[0.4071

0.009
[0.7371

0.042
[0.9901

0.026
[0.3431

-1.403
[0.512]

0.084
[0.003]***

-0.185
[0.940]

0.035
[0.1881

2.341
[0.331]

0.055
[0.036]**

-0.624
[0.787]
51.023
[0.0021***
20.016
[0.1241
-5.485
[0.6591
-9.272
[0.502]

-0.066
[0.028]**
-0.615
[0.027]**
-0.003
[0.974]
-0.163
[0.2791
-0.239
[0.0211**

-2.224
[0.305]
41.664
[0.009]***
22.315
[0.046]**
9.801
[0.2391
16.930
[0.2891

-0.017
[0.541]
-0.465
[0.2491
-0.227
[0.2421
-0.066
[0.5571
-0.256
[0.159]

0.787
[0.717]
32.941
[0.048]**
34.349
[0.0001***
22.130
[0.0091***
23.815
[0.0921*

0.003
[0.924]
-0.522
[0.172]
-0.269
[0.1821
-0.093
[0.4001
-0.304
[0.0751*
-0.001
[0.9871
-0.005
[0.0051***
-0.021
[0.0001***
-0.413
[0.119]
-0.135
[0.055]*
0.028
[0.622]

Non-business bankruptcies per
1,000

-0.016
0.744
[0.0021***
[0.1711
-0.257
11.599
[0.7581
j0.341J
-0.180
6.554
JO.OOI]***
J0.483]
6.997
0.040
[0.470]
[0.284]

0.940
[0.082]*
21.004
[0.589]
6.301
[0.505]
11.211
[0.096]*

-0.018
[0.000]***
-0.316
[0.219]
-0.190
[0.002]***
O.D35
[0.522]

13.543
[0.0021***
-0.604
[0.0001***
0.600
[0.1891
3.857
[0.8641
18.238
[0.012]**
14.102
[0.021]**

3.531
[0.6521

-0.095
[0.0761*

3.359
[0.667]

-0.083
[0.132]

5.747
[0.3251

-0.091
[0.1001

4.959
[0.5191

0.080
[0.2491
-0.238
[0.0051***
3458

7.549
[0.3511

0.080
[0.2591
-0.220
[0.009]***
3458

-0.937
[0.8941

0.026
[0.7281
-0.222
[0.0081***
3458

Percent bankruptcies Chapter 13
Ideology (liberal is larger)
Percent vote for Bryan in 1900
Restricts garnishment
Restricts wage assignment
Restricts security interests in
household goods
Foreclosure takes longer than six
months

Model3 (Income)
Rate
Selection

Thinks credit is a bad idea
Observations
3458
Other GSW variables omitted from table.

3458

3458
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Table 5: Effect on Total Amount Borrowed
(Robust p values in brackets; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
significant at 1%)
Modell
(GSWx
Asset)
Rate
Exemption x dummy variable for first
quartile of asset/income distribution
Exemption x 2d asset/inc quartile
Exemption x 3d asset/inc quartile
Exemption x 4th asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x I st asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 2d asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 3d asset/inc quartile
Unlimited x 4th asset/inc quartile
Ideology (liberal is larger)
Percent vote for Bryan in 1900
Restricts garnishment
Restricts wage assignment
Restricts security interests in
household goods
Foreclosure takes longer than six
months

Model3
(HMPx
income)
Rate

Model3
(HMPx

-0.05117
[0.0911*
O.Q38
[0.1821
0.09923
[0.0041***
0.17424
[0.0021***
-0.05969
[0.6151
0.00195
[0.9871
0.33092
[0.0001***
0.5752
[0.0041***
-0.0073
[0.3131
0.01753
[0.9521
-0.15097
[0.0741*
-0.04122
[0.5121

-0.03913
[0.0031***
-0.0129
[0.1101
-0.00018
[0.9751
O.QII33
[0.0571*

-0.01188
[0.0831*
-0.00164
[0.7761
0.01117
[0.0771*
0.00611
[0.5861

-0.01693
[0.0001***
-0.21283
[0.5501
-0.15233
[0.0021***
-0.0269
[0.6521

-0.00404
[0.6171
0.21519
[0.5541
-0.21164
[0.0131**
-0.04708
[0.4481

-0.365
[0.000]***

-0.08339
[0.265]

-0.34787
[0.000]***

-0.12081
[0.122]

-0.0783
[0.180]

-0.11989
[0.089]*

-0.08355
[0.109]

-0.08161
[0.238]

3458

-0.00558
[0.148]
3458

3458

-0.00541
[0.135]
3458

Model2
(GSWx
income)
Rate

Model
2(GSW X

-0.54792
-0.0914
[0.0001*** [0.0031***
-0.19772
0.04125
[0.0001*** [0.3131
0.12161
0.09028
[0.0001*** fO.OO!J***
0.15711
0.07459
[0.0001*** [0.020]**
-1.4264
-0.16945
[0.000]*** [0.095]*
-0.51355
0.22111
[0.000]*** LO.o25]**
0.19451
0.41679
[0.194]
[0.000]***
0.40267
0.11278
[0.029]** 10.512]
-0.00989
-0.00198
[0.2251
[0.801]
0.26626
0.15001
[0.6081
f0.64ll
-0.14907
-0.15347
[0.0241**
[0.0851*
-0.03146
-0.02787
[0.6801
[0.6571

-0.21143
[0.0031***
-0.08686
[0.0141**
0.01212
[0.7881
0.05193
[0.1671
-0.64449
[0.003]***
-0.33743
[0.014]**
-0.11089
[0.285]
0.17822
[0.176]
-0.0164
[0.0061***
-0.06855
[0.8661
-0.16815
[0.0021***
-0.04915
[0.4131

-0.36463
[0.000]***

-0.08181
[0.2901

-0.0596
[0.382]

-0.10747
[0.126]

Average income of household's
profession in ten thousands
Observations
3458
Other GSW variables omitted from table.

Model I
(GSWx
Asset)
Selection

-0.00681
[0.069]*
3458

***

income)

Selection

income}

Selection

